

## OUTGOING TELEGRAM LUR DARMOND OF STATE

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ACTION: URGENT NEW YORK 1075

INFO: AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 501

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Canadian Ambassador called on Cleveland this afternoon and gave him statement by Diefenbaker in House of Commons today.

Diefenbaker concerned that his remarks in House last night directly after President's speech, proposing that eight neutrals of ENDC make onsite inspection in Cuba to ascertain the facts, might be taken to cast doubt on the facts of the situation as outlined by President. Ritchie said Diefenbaker had been criticized for his earlier remarks and wished to clear up any misunderstanding that might exist in US Government.

Ambassador went on to clarify thought behind Diefenbaker proposal which was directed at UNGA debate following probable Soviet veto US RES when unpalatable proposals would be advanced.

He produced QTE first draft of draft resolution UNGTE which being given preliminary consideration in Ottawa destined meet this hypothetical situation. Inter alia draft proposes establishing investigation and observation group composed of eight ENDC neutrals to investigate charges that nuclear missiles and other offensive weapons have been introduced in Cuba and to report

Drafted by:

IO:WWallner:mfk 10/23/62

Telecommunications and  
datacoms received by:

Harlan Cleveland

DEPARTMENT EUR - Mrs. Friedman (by phone)  
DEPARTMENT EUR - Mr. Carlson (by phone)REPRODUCTION FROM THIS  
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report to SC or GA by December first.

Cleveland pointed out that we were still far from hypothetical situation which Canadian proposal designed meet, and might never get there. First Soviet public response to President's speech indicated that dispute might center not on fact of introduction missiles into Cuba but rather on whether their purpose was offensive or defensive. Development of situation in UN would depend on course of events in outside world; in first instance in Caribbean following Presidential signature-quarantine proclamation and interception first Soviet vessel. Any Canadian initiative should be geared to imminent dangers. In some situations an international dispute could be cooled off by dragging out the fact-finding process. But in this situation the President had acted on facts he had already found. What was required now was a relatively quick action to verify, not the pre-existing facts, but performance of Soviets in withdrawing offensive threat that had brought on crisis. US objection would not necessarily be to group of neutrals as verifiers but to assignment Canadians proposed for them and leisurely schedule they projected.

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(S)(I) Cleveland took occasion to reinforce our concern about reported Canadian position on nuclear test moratorium, as expressed in Presidential letter to Diefenbaker. Ritchie seemed uninformed on Ottawa's reaction to this approach.

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**TRANSCRIBED COPY FOLLOWS**

ACTION USUN NEW YORK

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[2 lines excised)

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